Introduction
Suppose I say to you \Here is a machine-checked proof of Fermat's last theorem". How can you use my putative machine-checked proof as evidence for belief in Fermat's last theorem? I start from the position that you must have some personal experience of understanding to attain belief, and to have this experience you must engage your intuition and perhaps other mental processes which it is not possible to formalize.
By machine-checked proof I mean an explicit formal derivation in some given formal system; I am talking about derivability, not about truth. This excludes computer mathematics systems that don't claim to check a speci ed formal system. Further, I want to talk about actually believing an actual formal proof, not about formal proofs in principle: to be interesting, any approach to this problem must be feasible. You might try to read my proof, just as you would a proof in a journal; however, with the current state of the art, this proof will surely be too long for you to have con dence that you have read and understood it. In this paper I attempt a technological approach for reducing the problem of belief in a formal proof to the same psychological and philosophical issues as for belief in a conventional proof in a mathematics journal. The approach is not entirely successful (see section 3.2) but is satisfactory in practice, and I argue it is the best we can do.
In the rest of this introduction I outline the approach and mention related work. In following sections I discuss what we expect from a proof, add details to the approach, addressing many of the problems that arise, and concentrate on what I believe is the primary technical problem: expressiveness and feasibility for checking of formal systems and representations of mathematical notions.
Outline of the approach
My approach is to separate the problem of how to believe a theorem when given only a putative formal proof into two subproblems: deciding whether the putative formal proof is really a derivation in the given formal system (a formal question), and deciding if what it proves really has the informal meaning claimed for it (an informal question).
To be be more speci c about the problem, I give you a putative proof of Fermat's last theorem formalized in a given logic. Assume it is a logic that you believe is consistent, and appropriate for Fermat's last theorem. The \thing" I give you is some computer les; there may be questions about the physical representation of the les, how to read them, the abstract language the proof is written in (i.e. how to parse the les as a purported proof), and correctness of the hardware and software to do this parsing. Ignore all of these for the moment (see section 4.4).
Is it a theorem? Is the putative formal proof really a derivation in the given formal system? This is a formal question; it can be answered by a machine. The di culty is how can you believe the machine's answer; i.e. do you trust the the proof-checking program, the compiler it was processed by, the operating system supporting it, the hardware, etc. This is usually taken to be the crux of the problem of believing machine-checked theorems.
To address this problem, you can independently check the putative proof using a simple proof checking program for the given logic, written in some meta-language, e.g. a programming language or a logical framework. In order to believe the putative derivation is correct, you must believe this simple proof checker is correct. I have in mind a proof checking program that only checks explicit derivations in the given logic, verifying that each step in the derivation actually follows by a speci ed rule of the logic; no heuristics, decision procedures, or proof search is required for checking, although these techniques may have been used in constructing the proof in the rst place. Such a simple proof checking program is a formal object that is much smaller and easier to understand than almost any non-trivial formal proof (and most informal proofs), so this approach greatly simpli es the problem 1 . I am not suggesting such a simple proof checker be used to discover or construct formal proofs, only to check proofs constructed with more user-friendly tools.
Since my goal is to reduce believing a formal proof to the same issues as believing a conventional proof, my favored technique for believing the correctness of a simple proof checker is to read and understand the program in the context of your knowledge of the logic being checked and the semantics of the meta-language in which the checker is written. We should use available techniques to make this task as simple as possible; e.g. using LCF style to implement the simple checker, so very few lines of code are critical for its correctness, or using an executable speci cation of the logic in a logical framework or generic proof checker. If the logic is simple enough, and the meta-language has a simple enough and precise enough semantics, then the sum total of what you are required to read and understand is neither longer nor more di cult to understand than a conventional proof, and belief in the putative derivation is attained through your personal experience of understanding. This approach di ers from the conventional one, of reading and understanding the proof yourself, only in being indirect, a kind of cut rule at the meta-level of the readers' understanding; rather than using personal intuition to believe a proof, you use personal intuition to believe a mechanism to check proofs. If you have understood a simple proof checker, and believe it correctly checks derivations in the given formal system, then you have reason to believe the correctness of a derivation it accepts.
You can also use other techniques to gain con dence in the simple proof checker; e.g. you can get the opinion of an expert on simple checkers, or use a publicly available checker from a library of checkers that are refereed by several experts, and that have high con dence from being used to check previous examples. If a few logics become accepted as appropriate for formalization, and large bodies of formal mathematics are developed in these few logics, then only a few independently refereed simple proof checkers are necessary, even though users may prefer many di erent tools for constructing proofs in the rst place. These techniques are similar to those used to gain con dence in conventional proofs, and seem to be even more reliable in the present approach. You can even formally verify that the proof checking program meets the speci cation of the formal system it claims to check, given some semantics of the meta-language.
What theorem is it? Having believed that my putative proof is actually a derivation in the claimed formal system, you ask \does it prove Fermats last theorem?" Is the meaning of the formal theorem really what is claimed? This is an informal question; it cannot be answered by a machine, as one side of the \equivalence" is informal 2 . You must bridge this fundamental gap by using your own understanding; you will want to consider the formal theorem in light of your understanding of the formal system (the logic) being used, any assumptions used in the proof, and all the de nitions used in stating the formal theorem. The di culty is how can you read the formal proof to decide its meaning for yourself, given the size and obscure presentation of many formal proofs. This issue is sometimes overlooked in discussions of the usefulness of formal proof.
You don't need to read the entire proof in order to believe the theorem. Given that you have reason to believe the putative proof is a correct derivation in the given logic (by independent checking as discussed above), only the outstanding assumptions, the formal statement of the theorem, and the de nitions used hereditarily in stating the formal theorem must be read. Although the formal proof, perhaps partially generated by machine, may contain many de nitions, lemmas and local assumptions, these need not be read, as we trust that they are all correctly formulated and used as allowed by the logic, since they are checked by our simple, trusted proof checker.
You can use the trusted simple proof checker to print out the undischarged assumptions, the statement of the formal theorem, and the de nitions used in stating this theorem. (It is necessary to trust the tool that shows us the assumptions used in the proof, as the formal proof is too big to read for ourselves and check that these really are all the assumptions used.) Then it is up you, using your own understanding of the formal system, the outstanding assumptions and the statement of the formal theorem, to decide if it means what is informally claimed. But this is anyway a subtask of believing a conventional proof in a textbook or journal; so this second subproblem of believing a formal proof is no more di cult than the corresponding aspect of believing a conventional proof.
A weak point. I claim to reduce belief in a proof to belief in the means of checking it, and that the means of checking it can be believed by processes of intellect of the same kind as used for believing conventional proofs, since a simple proof checker is a formal object that is simpler than a conventional proof. But this view of a proof checker as a simple thing depends on simple and believable semantics of the meta-language in which the proof checker is written. The problem is that I can't claim that believing the operation of a programming language and all its underlying software and hardware is a simple thing. Everybody knows that Unix has bugs, as does New Jersey SML; it would be foolish to think otherwise. This is a serious philosophical criticism, although most computer scientists won't nd it serious in practice. It is not a common problem that compiler, operating system or hardware bugs cause a proof checker to say \yes" when it means \no". Further, repeatability of such an error over several independent runs, using di erent compilers (for the same language), running on di erent operating system/cpu platforms is inconcievable. This is discussed further in section 3.2
Related work
The prototypical paper on this topic is DLP79], where it is argued that \Mathematical proofs increase our con dence in the truth of mathematical statements only after they have been subjected to the social mechanisms of the mathematical community", whereas machine-checked proofs \. . . cannot acquire credibility gradually, as a mathematical theorem does; one either believes them blindly as a pure act of faith, or not at all." I mostly agree with the rst statement, but completely disagree with the second, and present the means for social mechanisms of the mathematical community to operate on formal proofs, namely independent checking. Independent checking is not a new idea. It has been discussed in terms of increasing con dence in computer-based enumerative search (e.g. Lam90], see section 2.2 below). It is considered the standard approach in tasks such as computing many digits of . A proposal similar to the present paper (\verify the proofs rather than the programs which produce them") is made, in less detail, in Sla94].
There has been much discussion recently of the possibility and desirability of carrying out formal mathematics Boy94, Har96] . The present paper addresses many points necessary to carry out such a program.
2 What can we expect from a proof?
All belief held by a human being is based on that person's experiences of understanding, and all experiences of understanding derive from perception of evidence. In certain areas of discourse, like law and mathematics, there are more or less precise rules about what kind of perceptions should be accepted as evidence. No matter how precise the rules about evidence, it still depends on some operations of human consciousness to apply the rules and experience understanding or not. Without claiming anything deep about operations of human consciousness, there are some things we can say about human beliefs.
Truth
If God has mathematics of his own that needs to be done, let him do it himself.
Errett Bishop Bis67] We have no access to truth in either formal or informal mathematics; the way things \really are", with the natural numbers for example. For me this is neither a deep claim nor a serious limitation on our practice of mathematics; we have only our various notations for mathematical objects, and reasoning with and about them is the business of mathematics. Thus I will not discuss the truth of Fermat's last theorem, but will suggest how to approach the question of whether Peano Arithmetic (or ZF set theory, or the Calculus of Constructions, . . . ) proves Fermat's theorem for some given de nition of \natural number", \addition", etc. Some readers may want to carry on the argument from provability to truth themselves, but I don't see any di erence between informal and formal proof in this respect.
Certainty
At the moment you nd an error, your brain may disappear because of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and be replaced by a new brain that thinks the proof is correct. Leonid A. Levin, quoted in Hor93]
Everyone has had the experience of understanding and believing a proof at one time, and seeing an error in it at a later time. After such an experience, you must accept that it might happen again. Therefore the notion of certainty, like that of truth, is not of particular relevance to human knowledge. This view is not always accepted in conventional mathematics, where practitioners often talk of the certainty of a (correct?) proof. For example, a paper Lam90] about reliability of enumerative searches done by computer cautions \Notice that the assertion of correctness is not absolute, but only nearly certain, which is a special characteristic of a computer-based result." (Author's emphasis, but the underlining is mine, to contrast with my belief that no knowledge is absolute.) It doesn't seem credible that any useful analysis of the probability of error caused by software bugs in big calculations is possible, and I don't think this is what readers of proofs are looking for. What's important is how knowledgeable people working in a eld attain belief. Lam is commenting on his own proof that there do not exist any nite projective planes of order 10, which uses several thousand hours of supercomputer time, running many highly optimised (hence complicated) programs for di erent cases. It is clear why belief in such an argument is hard to come by, even with independent checking, which Lam suggests. This type of calculation is not a proof, not because it isn't \absolutely certain", but because there is no way for a reader to apply her own intuition to attain belief.
As an aside, my approach does raise a possibility that enumerative searches such as Lam's proof and the famous Appel and Haken proof of the four color theorem AH77, Tym79], which can never be accepted as conventional proofs, might be made into formal proofs: e.g. we prove that some program (lambda term) correctly tests numbers for certain properties, we prove that if a certain nite set of numbers have those properties then every map is four-colorable, and we formally execute the program on that nite set, i.e. show that two lambda terms are convertible by computation.
There is another kind of uncertainty often mentioned regarding formal veri cation that some hardware or software meets its speci cation. Even when we believe the proof, there is uncertainty about the behavior of the physical object, since the speci cation is with respect to some model of the physical world, and we can never completely model the world. This issue is closer to that of truth, than to certainty in reliability of the proof.
Probablistic proofs A red herring sometimes arises (e.g. DLP79]): since all proof is uncertain, why not abandon deterministic notions of proof in favor of probabilistic proof. Probabilistic proof systems Gol94] can be much more powerful than their deterministic counterparts. While they carry a probability of error, this probability is explicitly bounded, and can be reduced to any desired positive number. Such approaches involve random choices (coin tosses), but it is still necessary to apply the rules of the system correctly. For a well-known example, using Rabin's algorithm for primality testing Rab76] requires much less computation to test primality of very large numbers than conventional methods, but the probability bounds don't hold if you make mistakes in multiplication! In this paper I propose how to believe that you have correctly followed some set of rules. Further, even though probabilistic approaches require one to check very much smaller derivations than conventional approaches, this hardly supports a claim that the appropriate warrant for proof correctness is direct understanding of the proof, since probabilistic approaches abstract from the conventional meaning of a proof just as the indirect checking I propose.
Explanation
Explanation is purely informal, being the pointing out of what the author of the proof would like the reader to see. This pointing out is a kind of abstraction, and is at least as useful for a formal proof in a large le as for an informal proof. In formal mathematics, explanation has no bearing on the correctness of a putative proof, but may be very important in the process of constructing a proof, and in the reader's work of bridging the formal-informal gap to see that the formal theorem expresses what it informally claims to express.
3 Some Details of the Approach
Is it a theorem?
How is the putative formal proof of Fermat's last theorem constructed? Users interacting with some proof tool such as Alf, Coq, HOL, Isabelle, LEGO, NQTHM, Otter, . . . , develop a le that, when read by that proof tool, stimulates it to print \QED" or some such thing. This proof script is not a formal derivation, but rather contains instructions to the proof tool to nd a derivation in the given formal system. That is, the script tells the proof tool to use heuristics, decision procedures, tactics, etc., that are particular to that proof tool. These are programs to compute derivations in the underlying formal system; e.g. derivable or admissible rules of the o cial logic, or searches for derivations which may fail (see Pol95] ). For example, many proof tools will support some kind of tautology checking and some kind of equality rewriting.
Crucially, there is no need for you to understand any of the tactics or heuristics in order to independently check the claimed proof of Fermat's last theorem. In principle such tactics and heuristics, when they succeed at their task, check that their results follow by basic derivations in the underlying logic: this is the de nition of proof checking. The proof tool can write out the complete o cial derivation it constructs from the instructions in the proof script, and it is this o cial derivation that you can independently check in order to believe Fermat's last theorem. The questions to ask are whether it is feasible to write out the o cial derivation, and whether it is feasible to check it; section 4 is devoted to these questions.
3.2 The software/hardware platform How can you have con dence in correctness of a proof just because it was checked by a computer program? Maybe the compiler that processed the proof checker has a bug, or the operating system, or the hardware. Hardware can have soft errors, caused by random events, as well as actual errors in the design or construction. There are techniques we can use to have con dence that the programming language and its platform are behaving properly. The most useful technique is independent checking: use a standard programming language for the simple checker, so it can be compiled using di erent compilers, running on di erent platforms. For example Standard ML has several compilers, running on many di erent operating system/processor platforms. Also we can check the proof using other simple checkers put forward as believable by expert referees (section 1.1). This is analogous to the social process by which conventional proofs are believed Verifying the platform It is sometimes suggested that we should verify the correctness of the proof-checking program, and of the software and hardware that supports it You95]. Such a veri cation is another formal proof that has to be believed. Since any interesting computational platform is too complicated to believe directly, and the only tool we have for believing it indirectly uses a trusted computational platform, the approach cannot be well-founded. But veri cation is very e ective in producing reliable software and hardware, and should be used in the long term. We should always remember that even when software and hardware are proved to meet their speci cations, we have no certainty that the physical object will behave as expected.
Believing the platform, and the philosophical claim Conventional mathematics is based on a large body of knowledge that is accepted. At best, mathematicians take many years to attain belief in all that they accept; nonetheless this at least is possible. It seems impossible to fully reduce to individual understanding the belief that a computational platform behaves as speci ed, due to the non-well-foundedness of any veri cation of such a claim.
Still, there is another way to look at it. In order to believe conventional mathematics by direct understanding we must believe that our own computational platform, our nervous system, behaves correctly. For example, that we identify symbols consistently, and that our short term memory of just having understood a certain statement is correct. Every subjective experience depends for its interpretation on some abstract correctness assumption about experience itself. In believing a formal proof indirectly by believing a proof checker, we are also shifting this abstraction to some computational platform outside of our consciousness. This is not simply giving up; just as we are careful about checking that our experiences are internally consistent and match with that of other people, so we are careful about the computational platform we use, and compare it with other independent platforms. Such a shift of abstraction seems unavoidable if we are ever to accept as a correct a putative proof that cannot actually be checked by a person.
What theorem is it?
You now have a le that you can read, and that you believe is a derivation in the given formal system. Since you can read it (section 4.4), you know what string is claimed to be Fermat's last theorem, and you can parse that string as a formula. That formula may contain de ned names, and you can nd and parse (as formulae) the de nitions for these names. Is the proved formula Fermat's last theorem? You must read the formula and interpret it in the light of your understanding of the formal system. This is an informal operation; to do it, you must read all the de nitions that are used hereditarily in the formula, but may skip de nitions used in the proof but not in the formula. This is exactly how informal mathematics is done; and, no matter how big the formal proof, this process must be tractable, as the formula formally stating Fermat's last theorem is not signi cantly di erent than the informal statement. Informally we don't rede ne the natural numbers, all their basic operations, etc., for every theorem, and we don't read these de nitions when we check a proof of Fermat's last theorem, while formally we do so. This is not a serious di erence; conventional mathematics rests on a basis of mathematical knowledge that is previously believed, and formal mathematics must proceed in the same way, developing a library of formal knowledge covering this mathematical basis.
3.4 What have we gained, and where has it come from? I have suggested how belief in correctness of a formal proof comes from engaging our own understanding to check it (and recheck it if necessary), and from the social process of many knowledgeable readers independently checking it. The only way this di ers from informal mathematics is the extra indirectness in our checking, where we allow a machine to do the mechanical steps of pattern matching, substitution, etc. This extra indirectness is not a trivial matter: due to it we allow more things as proofs, e.g. derivations that are too big, or too combinatorially complicated, to be checked by a person, as mentioned in section 2.2.
An advantage hinted at above is that proofs in the same logic can be shared by di erent proof checkers for that logic, if a standard syntax can be found (or mechanical translations believed), because the o cial proofs don't depend on all the tactics and heuristics that are particular to individual proof tools. In current practice, of course, this idea is a can of worms, and even saying the phrase \in the same logic" causes experts in the eld to roll on the oor with laughter. However, alternative suggestions such as using cryptographic means to certify that a theorem has been checked by some proof tool Gru96] break the primary abstraction: the only way a proof checker can accept a theorem as proved is to actually check a proof of it.
It is necessary to restrict the notion of \proof checking program" to programs that actually check derivations in some given formal system, and to restrict the acceptable formal systems by criteria of feasibility of communicating and checking o cial derivations. This is discussed in section 4.
The eschewing of absoluteness is crucial to my argument. This is obvious, since absolute correctness cannot be attained by any means at all. However, some criticism of formalization seems based on the subtext that formal proof is not good enough since it cannot guarantee correctness. Formal proof can attain higher con dence than conventional proof, and can do so for more arguments.
About feasible formalisation
While correctness of derivations is de ned ideally in conventional logic (e.g. the size of a derivation has no bearing on its correctness 3 ), we are only interested in actually checked derivations. Pau94] . By \concrete presentation" I mean faithful to particular representation; all of these frameworks have been implemented as computer programs, and can be used as primitive proof checkers for any formal system they can express. However, for the purpose of actual formal mathematics, we are sensitive to properties of a formal system such as how large or complicated it is, for two distinct reasons. First, we are interested in believing mathematical statements from formal proofs, so we must be able to read and understand the formal system (logic) we are checking; this is an essential part of bridging the gap between a formal property and our informal belief. From this perspective, various presentations of rst order logic (FOL) are suitable formal systems: there are few rules, they are organized around useful principles (introduction, elimination), and it is much studied and widely accepted. On the other hand, the Nuprl logic Con86] is less satisfactory in this regard, as it has many rules, and some complicated side conditions (e.g. the Arith rule). The second reason that intensional properties of a formal system matter is that we want to actually check derivations of non-trivial statements in our formal systems, so the size of derivations, and more generally the feasibility of checking derivations is important. I will suggest technical means to ameliorate both of these limitations on our choice of formal system.
Formal systems for feasible checking
How to believe a formal system. One theme in this paper is using computers as a tool to bridge the formal-informal gap between a large formal object and our informal understanding of it. Since formal systems can themselves be studied mathematically in simpler meta-systems such as logical frameworks, we can apply the same technique to gain understanding and belief in a formal system that is otherwise too large or complicated. For example, the Nuprl logic can be formalized as an inductively de ned class or relation in FS 0 or in Martin-L of's framework, both of which are considerably simpler than Nuprl itself. Then various properties of formalized Nuprl can be proved in the framework, which might allow a reader who understands one of these frameworks to understand Nuprl as well.
Formal systems that are feasible to check. The second limitation is the requirement for feasible checking of derivations in a formal system. I discuss the relationship between styles of proof and feasible checking in section 4.2. Here I am interested in nding alternative presentations of a formal system, deriving the same judgements but with better intensional properties: smaller derivations, or ones that are easier to check. More generally, we can look for a di erent formal system (di erent language, deriving di erent judgements) that allows us to more feasibly check the original formal system in some indirect way. Two things can make a formal system computationally expensive to check: the derivations can be big, or the side conditions can be expensive to check. There is a tradeo between these two issues, as expensive side conditions can be replaced by big subderivations. However it is not always obvious how to factor big derivations into expensive side conditions.
As an example of big derivations, the Gentzen cut-free system for FOL is completely infeasible. It is well known that adding the cut rule doesn't change the derivable judgements and allows much smaller derivations, so the system with cut is a better choice for formal mathematics. Section 4.3 discusses how such meta-theoretic extensibility as adding admissible rules to a logic (e.g. the cut rule) can be supported by a simple, believable proof checker.
Another example of an alternative presentation with smaller derivations is \writing a derivation tree as a DAG". In a derivation tree, subderivations may have repeated occurrences, because they need to appear at di erent places in the tree. By using a linear presentation of derivations instead, where each line names the previous lines it depends on, only one occurrence of each subderivation is required; the indirectness of naming previous lines allows sharing 5 . Extending a formal system with de nitions allows a similar kind of sharing. The Automath languages used the technique of naming expressions, lines, and contexts to avoid duplication of work. In these cases just mentioned, we depend on the constructor of the derivation to nd the common substructures, but some formal systems duplicate work in such a uniform way that we can give an alternative system that shares some common substructures by construction. Martin-L of Mar71] gives an algorithm for type synthesis in his impredicative system (now called ) that transforms o cial derivations to avoid duplicate work. This idea is used in Huet's Constructive Engine Hue89]; an abstract explanation and machine-checked proof of correctness of this transformation on type systems is given in Pol94] section 4.4.10.
Another common technique for improving e ciency of checking a formal system is annotation of judgements so that a full derivation of a judgement can be mechanically constructed from the judgement itself. The use of decidable type checking as a tool for proof checking uses this approach, where the terms are annotations that can be expanded into full derivations, so full derivations don't have to be constructed or communicated. Equivalently, we can think of omitting parts of o cial derivations that can be mechanically reconstructed. In the calculus of constructions (CC), terms are essentially derivations with instances of the conversion rule and variable lookup elided. There is a clear tradeo to keep in mind: the more information we elide from derivations (making them smaller, so easier to communicate) the more has to be mechanically reconstructed (so making them more di cult to check). In CC, it is only possible to elide instances of the conversion rule because its side condition, convertibility of two well-typed terms, is decidable; but checking convertibility is certainly not feasible in general, so neither is proof checking without help from annotations.
In an interesting formal system there is always some derivation that is too hard to check with any possible hardware and software. Nevertheless, in the context of independent checking of proofs, annotations solve an important problem: suppose I have constructed some proof in CC, using clever heuristics for conversion testing; how can you believe this proof? By my paradigm, you can believe a proof checker for CC, and then check the proof with this proof checker. This approach is hopeless if your simple, trusted proof checker doesn't use adequate heuristics for conversion testing; it may be equally hopeless if you must believe all my clever heuristics, and also believe their correct implementation in your proof checker. On the other hand, my heuristics must have found a feasible conversion path to verify the proof (assuming I did actually check it), so if I annotate the proof with this conversion path, your checker need only follow the annotations, not use heuristics to discover a conversion path for itself. In LEGO, supporting type theories with de nitions, there is an observed problem of this kind: when interactively constructing a proof, a user can tell the proof tool which de nitions to expand, but the term constructed in the o cial language to witness the proof is not annotated with this information, and may be very expensive to re-check.
Feasible formal proofs
In the preceeding section I discussed formal systems that are suitable for actual checking. This section discusses issues of feasible checking of formal proofs, and more generally, of whole formal developments of mathematics. Even in a well-behaved formal system, there will be proofs that are infeasible because of proof style. Analogously, in programming, it is well known that there are feasible functions with infeasible implementations. For example, the natural recursive de ntion of the bonacci function is exponential in its input, while an alternative de nition is linear. Similarly, to support actually checking proofs, we will be restricted to proofs that can actually be checked. For example, if ack is the Ackermann function, trying to prove ack(100) ? ack(100) = 0 by computation is hopeless, while proving 8n:n ? n = 0 is trivial, and leads to a trivial proof of ack(100) ? ack(100) = 0.
Representation Just as in programming unsuitable representation of data is one of the causes of unfeasible programs, so in proofs unsuitable representation of the objects of discourse is a cause of uncheckable proofs. This may be hard to recognise in formal mathematics because we are used to representations from conventional mathematics, which were never intended to be used in actual formalization. Here is an example that made a measurable di erence in some LEGO proofs: I have never seen this de nition in an informal presentation, but it has the advantage for machine-checking that (tuple n) is canonical for all n, while (Tuple n) is not.
When we formalize a notion we make choices about representation, but there is no reason to believe there is a single "best" representation, or even any single good representation in the sense that it leads to natural statements and short proofs of theorems. However, we can make several de nitions for a concept, prove something about their relationship, and move between them as convenient. Some alternative de nitions may be used only for convenience or feasibility, while some may be true alternatives for the o cial de nition of some concept. Also note that our choice of representations is constrained by our underlying formal system (e.g. FS 0 cannot express generalized induction, while Martin-L of's framework can), and this may be a reason for choosing one framework over another.
An example is the use of unary representation and base representation for natural numbers. We probably want to use unary representation as the o cial de nition of the naturals, and base representation for any actual computation, e.g. for the computational content extracted from constructive proofs. In order to do this, elementary school arithmetic must be formalized, i.e. the correctness of various algorithms for arithmetic operations on base representation numbers.
An often discussed example of a notion that is hard to reason about formally is binding, and there are many representations in the literature. Variable names CF58] are the naive approach. De Bruijn indexes dB72], inspired by needs of machine implementation, are also convenient for formal reasoning in many applications. Even simpler is higher order abstract syntax (HOAS) PE88] as used in ELF and Isabelle. But HOAS doesn't naturally support structural induction, and sometimes it is desired to formalize expressions with names, since this is what people use. A new and interesting approach meets these needs Gor93, GM96] . However useful this approach turns out to be, it represents expressions only up to alpha conversion (as with de Bruijn indexes, HOAS, and another alternative Sat83]). A more intensional approach, using parameters and variables, is suggested in Coq91] and formalized in MP93, Pol94]. As just suggested, these representations are not all \isomorphic": a presentation of type theory using de Bruijn indexes has di erent theorems than one using parameters and variables 6 , but by formalizing the relationship between them, theorems can be stated and proved in their most natural forms, and used in di erent forms when needed. It may not be obvious what the o cial formalization of some informal concept should be (e.g. are de Bruijn terms the real meaning of lambda terms, or just a convenient representation), but formal mathematics doesn't have to split hopelessly over such questions. As long as your favorite de nition can be shown to be appropriately related to other de nitions in the formal literature, you can use existing results.
Even what I have said about new and di erent representations for mathematical notions is too restricted. We can look for entirely new ways to do mathematics that are especially suited for formalization in particular formal systems. An example of this is the use of formal topological models that has recently received interest in the Type Theory community. Persson Per96] describes the formalization of a completeness theorem for intuitionistic rst-order logic, using formal topological models as suggested by Sambin Sam95]. Coquand Coq] proposes a program of proof-theoretic analysis of non e ective arguments using formal topological models. Such problems seemed infeasible for Constructive Type Theory until this approach was developed.
How to believe a mechanical proof checker
Every computer program is a formal object, and in this sense, every output of every computer program is a mechanically-checked consequence of some formal system. The problem is, we don't know what formal system it is, and even if we could decompile the program to discover the formal system it checks, that system would be too big, complicated and ad-hoc for us to understand very much about it, or care. A proof checker is a program that checks a particular, speci ed formal system. For actually constructing formal proofs we may use a proof tool with many proof search heuristics, tactics, etc, but for believing a theorem from a formal proof we want a proof checker that we can believe is correct just by reading and understanding some of its code. The prototypical way to do this is using the \LCF style" of proof checker construction, such as used in HOL GM93]. HOL a cionados might argue that HOL is suitable for both constructing proofs, because of it's tactic language and rich library of available tactics, and for independently checking them to attain belief, since each tactic actually expands to atomic steps of the formal system, and only a small kernel of code must be read and understood to believe in the system's correctness. Only one thing is missing: the current implementation of HOL doesn't actually store or write out the o cial proof that is constructed by expanding all the tactics, although this is also under study by the HOL group Won93]. Without this feature, a reader cannot use other, independent checkers for the HOL logic to increase con dence in a proof, and cannot easily use proofs developed by other proof tools for HOL.
A concrete suggestion: the three-level approach. LCF style uses two-levels, with a computational meta-language (e.g. SML MTH90]) in which a proof checker for an objectlevel logic is programmed. Strong typing of the meta language is seen to guarantee that access to the atomic proof constructors of the object logic is safely controlled. Logical frameworks are suitable meta-languages for implementing believable proof checkers; these frameworks are more precisely and concretely speci ed than even the best programming languages and are designed speci cally for representing formal systems (although with current implementations there may be problems of e ciency). Further, in the frameworks mentioned above, derivable rules of represented object systems can be proved correct; these meta-proofs are analogous to LCF tactics that expand into an o cial proof. However a reader who believes in the framework can believe in a proof using derivable rules without actually expanding them, as s/he believes they could be expanded in principle. In the stronger frameworks, FS 0 and Martin-L of's framework, many admissible rules can also be proved correct, and again can be used as if they were o cial rules, since they could, in principle, be expanded into o cial proofs. I just used the phrase in principle twice, but am not going back on my committment for actual checking: we actually check derivations in an extended system that we believe, by actually checking admissibility of some rules, represents some other, less feasible system. Such meta-theoretic extensibility of believable proof checkers can greatly reduce the burden of actually checking fully expanded proofs Pol95].
The question then arises: where will we nd a believable implementation of a logical framework? We can use an LCF style implementation for this. Isabelle is an already existing example of this approach: you can believe Isabelle by reading only the safe kernel implementing the rules of its meta-logic, and you can get a proof checker for your chosen object logic just by specifying it in a \high-level" form. Isabelle does support proof of derivable rules of object logics, that are safely used without expanding to o cial steps of the object logic, but is not a perfect realization of my suggestion for two reasons. First, Isabelle uses proof theoretically strong higher-order logic as its meta-logic, and uses higherorder uni cation inside its safe kernel; we might want a weaker meta-logic and a simpler kernel (perhaps using Miller's 0 uni cation Mil91]). Second, Isabelle supports derivable rules, but not admissible rules of object logics Pol95]. The three-level approach places few restrictions on the object logic. A di erent approach is re ection ACHA90, ACUar, Har95] , that collapses the framework and the object logic in order to provide admissible rules that can safely be used without expansion. However re ection makes demands of the object logic, and seems much harder to believe in every way.
Reading the proof
Both parts of the approach, independent checking and understanding the statement of the theorem, require reading the proof les. There are two classes of question involved with this: correct speci cation and operation of hardware and software to read the les as a long ascii string, and of software to parse this ascii string as a proof, and to pretty-print parts of it so you can read them. The former is the job of the software/hardware platform; see section 3.2. For the latter, parsing is one of the formally best understood areas of computer science, so this should be no problem. Nonetheless, it does constrain the language of our o cial formal system: this must be parseable. User friendly proof tools often support complex user-extensible synatx, and even unparsable syntax entered using control keys and special editors, e.g. Nuprl 7 . Nuprl is an LCF style implementation, so suppose we believe the safe kernel correctly checks the rules of the formal system. On the screen we see that Nuprl accepts a proof whose conclusion appears to be Fermat's last theorem, but that string of symbols is not formally related to the o cial judgement that the kernel accepted, as Nuprl allows any string of characters to stand for any o cial expression. Part of the problem is that de nitions are meta-notation in Nuprl, not part of the o cial logic. Even proof systems that have o cial object-level de nitions often support (more or less principled) meta-notation (e.g. LEGO, Isabelle), and this should be viewed as part of what has to be understood and believed about a simple proof checker for their logics. This is usually overlooked in LCF style systems.
The business of formal mathematics
Some people believe that formal mathematics is \just lling in the details" of conventional mathematics, but \just" might be infeasible unless some thought is given to representation and notation. This can be considered to be a hassle, or to be the business of formal mathematics. This latter view leads us to be interested in areas of feasibility and expressiveness of formal systems, such as strict nitism (e.g. Car95]) and the power of formal systems to e ciently represent algorithms (e.g. Col91, Fre95] ), and to study formal representations of mathematical notions.
